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Economic analysts were surprised by the collapse of the Thai baht 
in July 1997. In the months that followed, most of the so-called East 
Asian Tigers faced severe balance-of-payments crises, and a year 
later, in August 1998, the Russian ruble was devalued. As a result of 
this succession of crises, the economics profession rethought many of 
its views on macroeconomic management. Lessons were drawn from 
the experience, and policy blueprints for avoiding future crises were 
developed. One of the key issues that emerged from the discussion 
is whether international capital markets are a source of stable and 
reliable financing, reacting optimally to changing global saving and 
investment patterns and conditions in emerging market economies, 
or whether they are a source of instability for these economies. The 
fact that many emerging economies with prudent macroeconomic 
policies have been hit by crises suggests that financing may be a 
source of instability. Further support of the “erratic finance” view is a 
historical pattern in emerging markets of current account deficits that 
grow when output is high—in apparent contradiction to the standard 
textbook model of the current account. Moreover, the question remains 
as to whether individual agents in emerging market economies will 
behave optimally in this erratic world, limiting their borrowing in 
anticipation of the next sudden stop, or whether they will act as if every 
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crisis is the last one, assuming that their countries fundamentals or 
global financial markets have evolved sufficiently to avoid the next 
round of turbulence.
In the decade since the eruption of the East Asian crises, a 
number of additional developments related to the current account 
and external financing have taken place, many of which contradict 
received wisdom. First, most emerging countries have been running 
large current account surpluses. Second, many advanced countries 
have been running large deficits—the United States is the most 
important case, but it is certainly not the only one. The combination 
of these two facts implies that capital has been flowing from poor to 
rich countries. Whether this pattern of capital flows is sustainable, 
and how adjustment will take place (if it is not) are key questions for 
policy makers in emerging economies. Another recent development 
is that several emerging market economies (including Chile) have 
seen growing gross international asset and liability stocks. For these 
countries, the current account is only one aspect of international 
financial integration, with gross flows and valuation effects playing 
an increasingly important role. The effect of these growing stocks of 
gross assets and liabilities on external adjustment in these economies 
is also a pressing policy concern. Closely related issues are: what 
is the optimal degree of capital account opening – both for inflows 
and outflows? Should taxes (or subsidies) be put in place to shift the 
composition of gross international assets and liabilities –towards FDI 
for example? Should small emerging economies actively try to issue 
external liabilities in domestic currency?
In addition to these global trends, several important policy issues 
for a small open economy (like Chile) remain open to discussion. What is 
the optimal exchange rate regime? And more specifically, should policy 
makers aim at a stable and depreciated exchange rate to foster growth? 
The ranges of policies in place (and recent experiences) suggest that 
we are far from a consensus on this issue. A closely related topic is the 
optimal level and composition of international reserves. Is it necessary 
to hoard reserves as a form of insurance against sudden stops? And 
if this is the case, how do optimal reserve levels vary with the level of 
gross international assets? Another key set of policy issues is whether 
the current account should be a policy target, the level of such a target, 
and the set of policies that should be implemented to pursue it.
This volume presents a group of papers that were presented and 
discussed at the Tenth Annual Conference of the Central Bank of 
Chile, “Current Account and External Financing,” held in Santiago on 3 Current Account and External Financing: An Introduction
9–10 November 2006. The objectives of this conference were to further 
understand the causes and consequences of recent patterns in global 
capital flows, to further understand the determinants of external 
financing for emerging market economies, and to provide insight 
into some of the main policy issues relating to external financing 
mentioned above. In this introduction, we discuss the most salient 
issues related to current account imbalances and present a reader’s 
guide to the volume. 
1. GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND ADJUSTMENT
In the last few years, the United States and other advanced 
Anglo-Saxon countries (including Australia, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom) have run large current account deficits. This 
unprecedented situation has generated concern among analysts 
and policymakers. Many argue that this situation is unsustainable 
and that, at some point, an adjustment will have to take place. 
Much of the recent research on the area explores whether the U.S. 
external adjustment will be gradual or abrupt, and how it will affect 
the (real) value of the dollar.1 Three broadly defined camps have 
developed among policymakers. The first group comprises those 
who believe that some adjustment is indeed required but that it 
will be gradual. Scholars such as Blanchard, Edwards, Eichengreen, 
Feldstein, Frankel, Mussa, Obstfeld, and Rogoff fall into this group. 
The second group encompasses those who think that a substantial 
adjustment will not be necessary and that the large U.S. deficit 
reflects a new reality in the international financial architecture. 
The most forceful representatives of this group are Dooley and 
Garber; other academics in this group include Caballero, Cooper, 
Gourinchas, Hausmann, and Sturzenegger. The final group is made 
up of those that believe that major, and possibly catastrophic, 
adjustment will have to take place in the short run. The chief 
representative of this view is Roubini. 
Most analyses of global imbalances focus on the behavior of 
large deficit countries, such as the United States. However, a full 
discussion on the topic—or at least a discussion that takes into 
account general equilibrium aspects—has to address the other side 
1. See, for example, recent papers published in the 2005(1) issue of the Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity; see also the articles in the September 2006 issue of the 
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of deficits: namely, surplus countries. Ben Bernanke made this point 
forcefully in a March 2005 speech (before he became Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board), in which he argued that the main cause 
of the U.S. external deficit was a major savings glut in the rest of 
the world. Bernanke’s words generated significant controversy, and 
many newspaper pages and blogs were filled with commentary on 
the future Chairman’s views.2
A number of scholars involved in the current debate argue that 
regional growth differentials are at the heart of global imbalances. 
The argument can be summarized as follows. Rapid growth in the 
United States has been associated with an increase in domestic 
investment (over savings), while slower growth in Europe and Japan 
has been associated with higher savings (relative to investment).3 
Global imbalances, the argument goes, are a reflection of regional 
growth differentials. An implication of this view is that, far from 
reflecting a serious problem, the large current account deficits in 
the United States are a sign of strength; they reflect the fact that 
the United States has been the engine of global growth over the last 
few years. According to this view, a realignment of growth—with 
an increase in growth in Europe and Japan and a slowdown in the 
United States—would play an important role in correcting global 
imbalances. In a recent interview, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
Hank Paulson “acknowledged to reporters that… he saw the problem 
of [U.S.] deficits as… part of the problem of other imbalances in 
other countries.” The secretary went on to say that the United States 
“has for a good number of years now been growing much faster than 
the major developed trading partners, Europe and Japan.” He then 
added that for the imbalances to be corrected, Japan and Europe 
had “to get the kind of growth on the consumption side that is going 
to make the difference.”4
2. See Bernanke (2005). Some recent theoretical papers investigate this issue, 
inquiring under what conditions the large U.S. deficit could be maintained over time. 
See, for example, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004). See also Caballero, 
Fahri, and Gourinchas (2006), Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000), and De 
Gregorio (2005). On the global savings glut, see Clarida (2005a, 2005b) and Hubbard 
(2005). One of the few empirical papers on the savings glut is Chinn and Ito (2005). 
See Chinn and Lee (2005) for a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of two surplus 
countries; see also Gruber and Kamin (2005). Two important volumes with papers on 
the U.S. deficit and global adjustment are Bergsten and Williamson (2004).
3. This argument is very general and refers to the relationship between investment, 
saving, and growth; no causality is implied in the above statement.
4. Steven R. Weisman, “Paulson Shows Talent for Reflecting Criticism,” 
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In his paper in the current volume, Sebastián Edwards addresses 
the issue of the relationship between growth differentials and 
global imbalances. He uses historical data to investigate whether 
large surpluses are persistent, and he analyses the process and 
speed through which large surplus countries have reduced their 
imbalances in the past. A particularly important question within 
the current debate is whether current account surpluses have 
historically led to large and abrupt declines. This issue is relevant 
given that such abrupt surplus adjustments would be required if, 
as some fear, the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries 
experienced a sudden stop of capital inflows and a rapid current 
account reversal. Edwards also investigates the connection between 
large surpluses and the business cycle, and he asks whether 
acceleration in the growth rates of the non-Anglo-Saxon advanced 
countries is likely to result on a decline in their surpluses and, 
thus, in global imbalances. 
The paper documents several stylized facts regarding current 
account adjustments. First, very few large countries have had 
persistently large surplus-to-GDP ratios. Surpluses are most 
persistent in the Middle East, which mostly reflects the role of 
oil-exporting countries. Second, large and abrupt reductions in 
surpluses—what Edwards calls surplus adjustment episodes—are 
rare. Their incidence fluctuates between 3.0 percent and 6.6 percent 
of all country years. Third, these surplus adjustment episodes have 
been associated with real exchange rate appreciations and with 
deterioration in the terms of trade. Fourth, the econometric results 
reported in the paper indicate that the behavior of the current 
account balance can be explained by parsimonious models based 
on economic theory. Finally, the results obtained suggest that a 
decline in growth relative to long-term trend of 1 percentage point 
results in an improvement in the current account balance (that is, 
a higher surplus or a lower deficit) of one quarter of a percentage 
point of GDP.
These results indicate that a realignment of global growth, with 
Japan and the Euro zone growing faster and the United States 
moderating its growth, would only make a modest contribution 
toward the resolution of current global imbalances. The world is 
thus likely to require significant exchange rate movements even 
if global growth does realign. The analysis also suggests that a 
reduction in China’s very large surplus will be needed if global 
imbalances are to be resolved.6 Kevin Cowan, Sebastián Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
2. EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT IN EMERGING MARKET 
ECONOMIES: REVERSALS AND CRISES
One of the characteristics of emerging market economies that 
access voluntary international capital markets is the occurrence 
of large reversals of the current and capital accounts—events 
that Rudi Dornbusch termed sudden stops.5 Until the mid-1990s, 
conventional economic wisdom placed the blame for these reversals 
on the domestic policies of the emerging economies, whether deficit 
fiscal spending (as in Krugman, 1979) or noncredible macroeconomic 
policies (as in Obstfeld, 1994). Many of the third-generation crisis 
models developed to explain the Asian and Russian crisis, however, 
allowed for imperfections in international capital markets that, when 
combined with domestic vulnerabilities, can lead to large capital 
account reversals.6
The chapter by Guillermo Calvo on the causes and consequences 
of sudden stops takes this view, arguing that events in international 
financial markets shift the supply of net saving available for emerging 
market economies. The surge in inflows to emerging markets in the 
1990s is thus due partly to developments in U.S. corporate bond 
markets and partly to the Brady plan, which converted defaulted 
bank debt into tradable bonds. Likewise, according to Calvo, the sharp 
collapse in net capital flows to emerging market economies in the late 
1990s largely resulted from the impact of margin calls on leveraged 
investors and changes in investor perceptions regarding International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts after the Russian crisis in 1998. The 
immediate implication is that emerging economies will be exposed to 
capital account volatility no matter how prudent their macroeconomic 
policies were, simply because they fall into a specific asset class.
This does not mean, however, that domestic policies do not 
matter. Calvo argues that several features of the domestic economy 
affect the extent to which this capital account turbulence translates 
into a full-fledged sudden stop, with the associated output and 
investment costs. Key among these features are the size of the current 
5. See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Edwards (2005) for a discussion of the 
causes and consequences of current account reversals. On the causes and consequences 
of sudden stops, see Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) and Guidotti, Sturzenegger, 
and Villar (2004).
6. See Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001); Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco 
(2000); Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999); Krugman (1998, 1999a, 1999b); McKinnon 
and Pill (1996); Schneider and Tornell (2004); Radelet and Sachs (1998).7 Current Account and External Financing: An Introduction
account deficit and the size of the tradables sector. Combined, these 
two variables determine the exchange rate depreciation required to 
adjust the current account once capital markets close for emerging 
market economies. Domestic liability dollarization, in turn, affects 
the extent to which the resulting depreciation will lead to domestic 
financial distress.7 
Emerging market economies can thus potentially avoid the dangers 
of capital market turbulence, but changing the level of openness and 
liability dollarization is likely to be a gradual process. In the meantime, 
Calvo proposes moving forward with reforms to international financial 
markets, perhaps by creating a fund that stabilizes the price of 
emerging market debt. A closely related issue is the capacity of 
countries to self-insure against sudden stops, an issue discussed by 
Aizenman (in this volume), Caballero and Panageas (2004), García 
and Soto (2005), and Jeanne and Rancière (2006).
Whereas Calvo’s chapter focuses on the levels and changes of 
capital and current accounts (net flows), chapters 4 to 7 extend 
this analysis to include additional aspects of international capital 
flows and reversals. All four contributions are motivated by the fact 
that gross capital flows have grown rapidly in recent years, in both 
developed countries and emerging market economies. The chapter by 
Fostel and Kaminsky and the chapter by Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco, 
and Neilson focus on gross capital flows—that is, the changes in 
international liabilities and assets. The chapters by Pistelli, Selaive, 
and Valdés and by Gourinchas, on the other hand, discuss the impact 
of stocks of international assets and liabilities and their valuation on 
international adjustment. The paper by Fostel and Kaminsky focuses 
on one component of gross capital inflows: namely, primary issuance by 
Latin American economies in international markets8. The paper builds 
a data set that assembles information on the issuance of bonded debt, 
equity, and syndicated loans from 1980 to the present. Using this data 
set, the authors characterize the access of emerging market economies 
in Latin America and the Caribbean to international financial markets. 
In some aspects, the pattern that emerges is very similar to that of 
7. Several recent papers address the risks of liability dollarization. For a survey of 
the macroeconomic evidence, see Levy-Yeyati (2006); for a survey of the microeconomic 
evidence, see Bleakley and Cowan (2007).
8 Net capital flows are made up of inflows (changes in the liabilities of residents) 
and outflows (changes in the international assets of residents). Inflows, in turn, equal 
the primary issuance of liabilities minus the repayment of existing liabilities. For 
example, a bond issued by PEMEX will increase inflows. Repayment of this bond will 
reduce inflows.8 Kevin Cowan, Sebastián Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
net capital flows: a boom in the early 1980s, followed by a closure of 
markets in the wake of the debt crisis, followed by a new boom in the 
early 1990s. The patterns diverge in the late 1990s, however. Whereas 
net flows indicate a complete closure of capital markets, gross primary 
issuance shows that the private and public sectors were accessing 
markets even in the midst of the crisis in 1998 and 1999. Issuance 
did fall, but this was not a full closure of markets. This view stands 
in contrast to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002), who suggest that 
sudden stops are the result of a full closure in capital accounts.
More generally, Fostel and Kaminsky seek to identify the extent 
to which primary issuance for the largest Latin American countries is 
driven by domestic or global factors. The answer is mixed. Although 
domestic macroeconomic variables are uncorrelated with issuance, 
domestic political variables do matter. At the same time, global factors 
measuring global liquidity or risk appetite (namely, the term structure 
of U.S. rates and the high-yield spread) and crisis events in other 
emerging market economies are correlated with gross issuance, with 
higher liquidity and less risk appetite leading to higher gross issuance. 
Indeed, the authors find that the boom-bust cycle that started in the 
early 1990s was largely driven by global events.
Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco, and Neilson emphasize that sudden 
stops may be less frequent than many authors argue. The authors 
categorize large capital account reversals according to the importance 
of changes in gross inflows in the net change.9 At one extreme—and 
closest to the view that international markets are the source of 
vulnerability—are sudden stops driven fully by reversals in inflows. 
At the other are sudden stops triggered by domestic agents running 
for the door, as was the case in Chile in 1998.
The results presented by Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco, and Neilson 
do not imply that international financial imperfections do not play a 
role. Most sudden stop episodes are indeed driven by inflow reversals. 
The authors suggest, however, that the role of these external shocks 
may be overstated, and that closer attention needs to be paid to 
domestic variables that lead to large outflows by residents. The authors 
further argue that the key difference between developed and emerging 
economies is not the fickleness of international capital inflows, but 
the response of outflows to these changes. In developed economies, 
inflows and outflows covary closely, so that inflow stops are usually 
matched with a reduction in foreign assets (and vice versa). This result 
9. Faucette, Rothenberg, and Warnock (2005) pursue a similar line of research.9 Current Account and External Financing: An Introduction
has interesting policy implications. It suggests that countries have 
several lines of defense against international financial shocks. The 
first involves assets and liabilities themselves. A highly integrated 
country can accommodate an inflow shock by running down foreign 
assets. Reserve accumulation is one (centralized) way of doing this. 
Lacking reserves or other foreign assets, a country must move to its 
second line of defense—that is, its ability to generate foreign liquidity 
from its productive assets. This point is emphasized by Calvo (in this 
volume), when he argues that the ratio of the current account deficit 
to the size of the tradables sector is key in explaining resilience to 
international financial shocks.
The growing gross flows that motivate chapters 4 and 5 go hand 
in hand with the growing stock of international assets and liabilities 
that motivates the contribution by Pistelli, Selaive, and Valdés. The 
sum of gross international assets and liabilities over GDP in developed 
economies increased from 0.45 to 3.0 between 1970 and 2005. For 
emerging markets, the ratio rose from 0.15 to 1.20 in the same period. 
The chapter explores the impact of these stocks of international assets 
and liabilities on several aspects of international adjustment. It 
analyzes how current account deficits (flows), gross international asset 
and liability positions (stocks), and valuation effects (prices) influence 
the likelihood of current and capital account reversals, movements 
in the exchange rate, and country risk ratings. The key finding by 
Pistelli, Selaive, and Valdés is that both flows and gross stocks matter 
for the likelihood of current account reversals and sudden stops. They 
also find that a larger current account deficit in the previous period 
increases the likelihood of both forms of reversals, which is line with 
the findings of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Edwards (2002, 
2004). More interestingly, however, they report that the composition 
of gross assets and liabilities (but not their level) matters for the 
likelihood of reversals: larger shares of portfolio equity in gross assets 
and larger share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in gross liabilities 
reduce the likelihood of these crises. These findings support the 
work of Levchenko and Mauro (2006) on FDI liabilities. Moreover, 
taken together with the results from Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco, and 
Neilson (in this volume), they paint a broad picture in which stocks 
of (liquid) international assets play an important role in reducing the 
probabilities of current account or financial account closures.
The chapter by Pistelli, Selaive, and Valdés also provides evidence 
on the effect of changes in the prices of assets and liabilities in 
country portfolios on external adjustment. Although the impact on 10 Kevin Cowan, Sebastián Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
crisis probabilities is smaller than the effect of the current account 
deficit, positive valuation effects (that is, rising prices in gross assets 
vis-à-vis liabilities) make current account reversals and exchange 
rate crisis less likely.
Because of the rising stocks of gross assets and liabilities, changes 
in the value of these assets and liabilities (stemming from individual 
asset price or exchange rate fluctuations) are playing a growing role 
in the international adjustment process. These valuation effects are 
often larger than current account deficits. The chapter by Pierre-
Olivier Gourinchas summarizes recent research on the implications 
of these valuation effects for international adjustment in developed 
and emerging economies.
The bottom line of this chapter is that the simple intertemporal 
approach to the current account is incomplete, because current accounts 
do not include the unrealized capital gains that arise from valuation 
effects. The most recent example of this is the U.S. current account 
deficit. The United States earns systematically different returns on 
its foreign assets and liabilities, which allows for sustainable current 
account deficits. Possible explanations for these persistent return 
differences include the use of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, the 
maturity differences in U.S. assets and liabilities, and the premium 
on the high liquidity of U.S. asset markets.10 Hence, no adjustment 
may be needed to the current deficit. The flip side is that emerging 
market economies need to generate long-run current account surpluses 
in order to pay the United States for the liquidity of their assets and 
other services of the dollar and U.S. financial markets.
Valuation effects also have important implications when adjustment 
is needed (for example, in response to adverse terms-of-trade shocks). 
Here the key variable is the currency composition of gross assets and 
liabilities. Consider the case of the United States, with liabilities in 
U.S. dollars and assets in foreign currency. In the face of a negative 
terms-of-trade shock, the required adjustment of the real exchange 
rate for the United States will be reduced by its liability and asset 
structure. A currency depreciation has two effects. On the one hand, it 
increases exports and decreases imports. On the other, it increases the 
dollar value of foreign assets (and the gross factor payment for these 
assets). The picture is different for most emerging market economies. 
10. These persistent differences have variously been termed the exorbitant privilege 
(Gourinchas and Rey, 2005) and dark matter (Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2006). See 
also Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006).11 Current Account and External Financing: An Introduction
Emerging markets often only have international liabilities, which are 
denominated in dollars (or other international currencies). In this case, 
valuation effects hinder adjustment, as the trade effects of an exchange 
rate depreciation are offset by a higher local currency value of foreign 
liabilities. The empirical relevance of this channel in emerging market 
economies remains untested, however, given the lack of data and, 
especially, good measurements of the currency composition of assets 
and liabilities. Hence, a first implication is the urgent need to expand 
the available information on the currency composition of gross assets 
and liabilities in emerging economies.
3. EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES: 
CURRENT ACCOUNT AND EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS
In addition to being subject to large reversals, current accounts are 
more pro-cyclical in emerging markets than in developed economies 
(rising with positive output or terms-of-trade shocks). Many observers 
interpret this as additional evidence of international financial 
imperfections. The next two chapters of the volume explore this 
aspect of international adjustment using dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models. One advantage of this approach is that 
it allows the analyst to evaluate not only whether certain frictions 
can generate changes in the direction observed in the data, but also 
whether they can match the size of the changes.
DSGE models have become the workhorse of macroeconomic 
analysis in the last few years. They have proved particularly useful 
for understanding how advanced economies react to a number 
of shocks. A limitation of this approach, however, is that most 
models are not particularly well suited for analyzing the behavior 
of emerging economies. They tend to predict too much consumption 
smoothing, counter cyclicality of key variables, and relatively low 
volatility. A number of authors have recently modified some of the 
key assumptions of the standard DSGE in an effort to better capture 
the peculiarities of middle-income and emerging economies. Although 
these efforts represent important contributions toward a better 
understanding of the dynamic behavior of emerging markets, they do 
not fully capture the specificities of nations with strong commodity 
export bases, such as Chile.
In his contribution to this volume, Jaime C. Guajardo develops 
a DSGE model for the Chilean economy. He makes a number of 12 Kevin Cowan, Sebastián Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
adjustments to the standard model in order to capture the most 
important features of the actual economy. First, he considers the 
existence of capital market imperfections; in particular, he assumes 
that the country in question has limited access to the international 
capital market, identified as an external borrowing constraint. Second, 
he assumes that domestic firms have differing abilities (capacity) 
to tap capital markets, with firms producing tradable goods having 
an advantage over firms producing nontradables. These types of 
asymmetry have been considered by scholars such as Caballero, 
Tornell, and Westermann. Guajardo’s main result is that both financial 
constraints and sector-specific financing wedges are needed for the 
model to replicate the Chilean data. This sector-specific component 
is one possible explanation for the apparently contradictory results 
obtained in the second DGSE model in the volume, in the contribution 
by Aguiar and Gopinath.
After discussing the most salient features of emerging market 
business cycles, Aguiar and Gopinath develop a model in which middle-
income countries may default on their debts. Their formulation is based 
on early work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) on sovereign borrowing. 
Shocks to interest rates are introduced in the Euler equations.11 An 
important characteristic of this model is that interest rate shocks are 
related to productivity shocks. This allows for a richer response of both 
consumption and investment. 
The authors then use the model to analyze the case of Mexico. They 
consider two cases. In the base case, they only allow for productivity 
shocks, and they find that the random walk component of the Solow 
residual is twice as high as that of Canada. This is in line with previous 
work by the authors, in which they argue that the main difference 
between emerging and developed economies is not their access to 
financial markets, but the persistence of their productivity shocks. In 
the second exercise, the authors incorporate interest rate shocks, and 
they find that the random walk component of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth remains almost at the same level as before. This leads 
the authors to conclude that the addition of interest rate shocks at the 
level of the Euler equations “add[s] little to matching the facts in the 
data for emerging markets.” Finally, Aguiar and Gopinath analyze 
Chile’s macroeconomic data and find a pattern of behavior similar to 
that of other emerging economies.
11. Other authors introduce stochastic disturbances directly into interest rates 
(Neumeyer and Perri, 2005). 13 Current Account and External Financing: An Introduction
Taken together, two lessons emerge from the chapters by Guajardo 
and by Aguiar and Gopinath. The first is that it is a mistake to focus 
exclusively on international financial imperfections (or restrictions) 
in explaining macroeconomic patterns in emerging market economies. 
The second is that simple (symmetric) financing constraints do a 
poor job in replicating emerging market dynamics. The immediate 
implication is that the profession needs to start thinking beyond 
models of aggregate external financing restrictions. How international 
saving is intermediated in the domestic financial system (and among 
domestic agents) therefore becomes an important research question 
(an issue raised in Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2002).
Medina, Munro, and Soto, in turn, develop a stochastic general 
equilibrium model to analyze the dynamics of current account 
behavior in two commodity-producing countries: Chile and New 
Zealand. By considering two commodity-exporting nations at 
different stages of economic development and with different 
institutional and market structures, they are able to provide a 
rich discussion of the role played by different factors in current 
account behavior. They find that foreign financial conditions, 
foreign demand shocks, and commodity price shocks account for 
more than half of current account variations in both countries at 
horizons of up to four years. The most important external shock 
is the change in foreign financial conditions. The most important 
domestic shock in both countries was the domestic investment 
shock, whereas monetary and fiscal shocks (defined as deviations 
from estimated policy rules) played a minor rule.
One important difference between the two countries is that 
commodity prices have a larger impact in New Zealand than in Chile. 
The authors interpret this as reflecting differences in ownership 
structure: while the export sector is domestically owned in New 
Zealand, foreign companies and the public sector are most important 
in the Chilean copper industry. A second difference is in the currency 
composition of foreign debt, an issue addressed in detail below.
4. POLICY ISSUES
Several of the papers in this volume directly address the policy 
issues listed at the beginning of this introduction. We summarize the 
main results of these chapters in this section.
An interesting recent development in emerging market economies 
is the growing stock of international reserves. Despite the common 14 Kevin Cowan, Sebastián Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
trend, however, reasons given by countries for holding these reserves 
vary. A first set of countries hold reserves as self insurance against 
shocks, which ideally implies reducing the volatility of the economy 
(see, for example, García and Soto, 2005; Caballero and Panageas, 
2004; Jeanne and Rancière, 2006). A second set of countries use 
reserve accumulation as a mechanism for fostering GDP growth 
by limiting real exchange rate misalignments or, more actively, by 
implementing a mercantilist motivation (see, for example, Aguirre 
and Calderón, 2006). The chapter by Joshua Aizenman addressees 
the benefits of reserve hoarding as a means of reducing volatility. 
The author revisits the empirical evidence of Aizenman and Riera-
Crichton (2006) on the impact of international reserves on the real 
exchange rate’s sensitivity to terms-of-trade shocks. The main finding 
is that reserves affect the elasticity of the real exchange rate to terms 
of trade in emerging economies. Aizenman rationalizes this finding 
by presenting a theoretical model in which maintaining and using 
international reserves is a way of avoiding early liquidation in a world 
of banking intermediation (à la Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and shocks 
to project returns. Terms of trade would be, in his view, an important 
determinant of project returns.
Aizenman also presents evidence that, for developing countries, 
a larger stock of international reserves is positively associated with 
higher persistence of the current account. Aizenman first measures 
the persistence of the current account ratio country by country and 
then seeks to explain the variation in cross-country persistence 
with different covariates, including international reserve holdings. 
He concludes that, insofar as a more persistent current account 
signals a lower likelihood of sudden adjustments, international 
reserve hoardings provide a clear benefit by lowering volatility. This 
finding is broadly in line with the policy prescriptions of Calvo’s 
chapter, where reserves play a role in self-insuring against global 
financial turbulence.
The insurance motive provides a powerful rationale for 
international reserve accumulation. However, hoarding international 
reserves also entails costs in terms of financial expenses and 
moral hazard (including the dollarization of liabilities if reserve 
accumulation is taken to signal low exchange rate volatility).12 These 
12. Soto and others (2004) undertake precisely that type of evaluation for the case 
of Chile for the early 2000s; they conclude that the country’s stock of reserves at that 
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costs, as well as the costs arising from international coordination 
and competition, are behind Aizenman’s conclusion that reserve 
accumulation is no panacea. 
With regard to the role of international reserve accumulation in 
promoting growth (either by stabilizing the exchange rate or through 
an undervalued currency), the chapter by John Williamson defends 
the idea that central banks should include an active intervention 
policy to avoid exchange rate misalignments within a flexible 
exchange rate regime. He argues that this policy does not compete 
with price stability—the primary goal—but is crucial to avoiding 
the detrimental effect of misalignments on growth (see Aguirre and 
Calderón, 2006; Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007). Drawing on 
evidence of imperfect exchange rate markets, he argues that central 
banks should not commit to being on the sideline of the market. As a 
concrete approach, he proposes that the monetary authority regularly 
publish an exchange rate zone (based on effective real exchange 
rate calculations) within which it would not intervene. Outside that 
zone, the authority would have the right (but not the obligation) to 
intervene. This approach is different from actual practice, even in 
countries that have heavy intervention policies in place, but it is an 
interesting idea to asses. 
Williamson and Aizenman both discuss the merits of using 
international reserves to persistently undervalue the local currency, 
foster competitiveness, and thus promote export-led growth. Both 
conclude that the strategy is dubious. Williamson argues that even 
if there is a growth-maximizing real exchange rate, and that this 
rate is different from the one determined by economic fundamentals, 
the reserve-hoarding strategy poses two practical problems. First, 
the value of that optimal real exchange rate level is unknown, and, 
second, foreign exchange market intervention policies are not able 
to sustain a persistent undervaluation. If policymakers do engage in 
trying to undervalue the currency, they should adjust fiscal policy, use 
capital account regulations, save abroad, or impose taxes on exports. 
He warns, however, that all of these practices are politically complex 
and have important side effects.
Aizenman’s argument runs on somewhat different grounds. 
First, he claims that the precautionary motive better describes 
current reserve policies than the mercantilist motive (Aizenman 
and Lee, 2005). Second, he argues that what really matters in 
Asia (the region where this strategy could have been played out 
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reserve accumulation, but its role in financial policy more broadly, 
particularly as a buffer for financial distress. What Japan and 
Korea had in the past and China has today is financial, rather 
than monetary, mercantilism. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to 
empirically disentangle the motives behind reserve accumulation. 
Standard economic fundamentals do appear as statistically 
significant determinants in estimates of demand for reserves (see 
Soto and others, 2004; Redrado and others, 2006), but they explain 
a very small portion of the total variance. Country fixed effects 
continue to be the dominant variable, by far. 
Another policy issue discussed in the volume is the effect of the 
currency composition of financial liabilities on the economy’s behavior 
under different shocks. In this regard, Calvo discusses the dangers 
of domestic liability dollarization and the merits of alternative 
policies that help attenuate it. Taxes to discourage dollar borrowing 
are difficult to implement and may be costly for growth. Exchange 
rate volatility, which would make exchange rate risk more obvious 
to the private sector and thus limit liability dollarization, has other 
disadvantages, such as hindering trade. In Calvo’s view, issuing public 
debt in a country’s own currency is a valuable first step to avoiding 
domestic liability dollarization. However one should not ignore the 
traditional moral hazard arguments (time inconsistency) associated 
with peso-denominated public debt.
Aizenman also addresses the issue of domestic liability 
dollarization, emphasizing the moral hazard effects of an active reserve 
management policy that artificially lowers the perception of exchange 
rate risk to the public and thus exacerbates dollarization. Moreover, 
one could argue that the larger the foreign exchange rate position of 
a central bank (that is, the mismatch between dollars and pesos), the 
larger must be the liability dollarization of the rest of the domestic 
economy if foreigners are not holding more pesos in their portfolios. 
Thus, the simple aggregation of the different sectors’ balance sheets 
shows that higher reserve accumulation can yield higher liability 
dollarization for the private sector.
The issue of liability denomination is again taken up in the 
chapter by Medina, Munro, and Soto, who analyze how the Chilean 
economy would respond to different shocks if its external debt was 
denominated in pesos rather than dollars. For the exercise, they use 
their DSGE model estimated for both Chile and New Zealand to study 
the dynamics of the current account. The differences found between the 
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debt are moderate, which is not surprising given that their model 
does not have balance sheet effects with real effects through financial 
frictions, although they do consider standard valuation effects 
arising from currency mismatches. In general, GDP, consumption, 
and investment are less sensitive to external shocks if the debt is 
denominated in pesos instead of dollars. Monetary policy has less of 
an effect on the current account under peso debt than under dollar 
debt, mainly through higher net interest payments. 
Another issue analyzed both directly and indirectly in some of the 
chapters of this volume has to do with the desirability and feasibility 
of targeting the current account. In this regard, the different countries’ 
experiences documented throughout the volume provide a rich source 
of perspectives. Among the cases discussed in the volume, the policy 
framework in place in Chile in the 1990s (analyzed by Medina, Munro, 
and Soto) is at one extreme. A ceiling for the current account deficit 
was a declared policy target for the Central Bank (together with price 
stability), while an exchange rate band and active monetary policy 
accompanied by capital controls were the instruments used to achieve 
these objectives (see Massad, 1998).
At the other extreme is the case of Australia in the last 
decade and a half. As the chapter by Belkar, Cockerell, and Kent 
documents, the large and persistent current account deficit has 
been regarded as an equilibrium phenomenon—the Pitchford 
thesis—which should not be distorted by policy actions. Within 
a well-established inflation-targeting-cum-floating framework, 
Reserve Bank officials have stated that the current account deficit 
should not be an objective for monetary policy. Indeed, the most 
prominent dissenting views on the Australian policy choices have 
come from external institutions, particularly the IMF and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
while both the government and the domestic academia hold the 
hands-off view. This was not always the case. In the early 1980s, 
for instance, fiscal policy was geared toward consolidation largely 
because of the external deficit, while structural reforms were 
also packaged as serving to close the external gap. New Zealand 
(which is revisited in Medina, Munro, and Soto’s chapter) also has 
an inflation-targeting-cum-floating regime and similarly does not 
regard the current account as a policy objective. 
The experience of the Asian countries, as analyzed in Ramon 
Moreno’s chapter, lies in between the cases of Chile in the 1990s and 
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considered too large in some countries and policy measures were 
designed to moderate them, the authorities faced severe constraints 
to achieving this as a target. In the first place, policymakers focused 
on fostering private savings rather than moderating investment, 
because high GDP growth was a priority. In addition, monetary policy 
was not used mainly because of exchange rate constraints. Hence, 
although the current account was a target, the lack of instruments 
precluded its control. 
From the perspective of desirability, one could argue that the 
evidence discussed in the chapters by Calvo on sudden stops and 
Pistelli, Selaive, and Valdés on reversals implies that a large current 
account deficit is a variable to which policymakers should react. In 
the past decade, however, the discussion in several countries has 
shifted away from the view that the current account deficit should be 
considered as a leading indicator of vulnerability to external crisis. The 
chapter on Australia pushes this idea, arguing that both the details 
behind what is driving the current account and other supplementing 
indicators should be analyzed. In Asia, the approach seems to be 
similar: according to Moreno, current account deficits were not deemed 
extremely dangerous in the mid-1990s because they reflected an 
investment boom. Today, even if that were the case, policymakers 
would look at other indicators such as credit growth and investment 
ratios as signals of excess.
What is clear is that standard macroeconomic policies that 
exacerbate large external deficits should be avoided. Because 
episodes of large current account deficits are strongly correlated 
with episodes of domestic boom this is likely to be the case. 
Interestingly, Medina, Munro, and Soto report that external 
variables (both real and financial) and investment-specific shocks 
play a key role in explaining the path of the current account over 
the last couple of decades in both Chile and New Zealand. Neither 
fiscal nor monetary policy shocks have a prominent responsibility 
in explaining the large deficits.13 
An additional instrument that some countries have used to 
influence the current account is capital controls. In his chapter Calvo 
discusses one specific type—namely, a tax on dollar debt—as a tool for 
limiting domestic liability dollarization and, therefore, for minimizing 
a structural vulnerability. Williamson also argues that capital controls 
13. Permanent productivity shocks do not have an important role either, which 
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on inflows could, to some extent, limit an exchange rate overvaluation 
and even depreciate the currency persistently. Moreno, who focuses 
on the experience of Southeast Asian countries, concludes that the 
effectiveness of controls put in place varied and that, at any rate, 
they did not prevent the Asian crisis. Particularly interesting is his 
discussion of the experience of Malaysia in the mid-1990s, whereby 
controls appeared to reduce some vulnerability indicators relative 
to peer countries, but they did not prevent the build up of current 
account deficits.
The previous discussion is part of a broader question: 
whether restricting capital mobility reduces emerging countries’ 
vulnerability to current account reversals or other shocks. Empirical 
evidence reported by a number of scholars—including some authors 
represented in the current volume—indicate that capital controls 
do not significantly reduce the probability of facing an external 
shock, such as a current account reversal.14 In the current volume, 
the contribution by Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco, and Neilson 
suggests that financial integration has a stabilizing effect, by 
allowing countries to accommodate non fundamental shocks to 
gross inflows and outflows. Moreover, a number of papers document 
that restricting capital mobility results in non trivial distortions 
and microeconomic costs.15
Finally, Calvo argues that establishing a global fund to stabilize 
key international financial prices has the potential of helping 
stabilize emerging market economies. The basis for this claim is that 
foreign financial shocks, coupled with domestic vulnerabilities, are 
the main financial problems in these economies. The shocks would 
therefore be smaller if a fund was able to suppress, or at least limit, 
excess volatility in international financial markets, in particular 
key financial prices such as credit spreads. This role, according to 
Calvo, should go beyond providing information (or surveillance) and 
would require actual trading. Of course, a fund of this type would 
need strong international support16. Other shortcomings include 
the side effects that could arise in other markets not considered 
by the stabilization fund. 
14. See De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000).
15. See Forbes (2003) for an analysis of the Chilean case.
16. The fact that the fund would trade against private markets raises the potential 
for large losses that would require additional capital contributions from countries 
leaving the fund susceptible to strong political pressures.20 Kevin Cowan, Sebastián Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdés
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